An overview of the Afar Issa conflict


#Dahilon_Yassin_Mohammoda, 20 August 2022 


 The_Afar primarily live in the Afar Region of Ethiopia in addition to Eritrea and Djibouti where the Afar and Issa are the two major ethnic groups. The Issa, one of the many Somali clans (a subdivision of Dir clan family), primarily live in the Somali Region of Ethiopia mainly in Sitti zone and make up a large chunk of the chartered city of Dire Dawa. 

The Issa, further, live in Djibouti where they currently dominate the state power and inhabit Awdal region in Western Somaliland.The two groups who speak different languages have a lot in common.

As Markakis (2003) put it, the “Issa-Afar conflict is the most protracted and intractable violent communal conflict in the Horn of Africa ''. It is arguably the longest conflict in the region, and one of few well documented. Abundant material with records of incidents and sequence of events over a long period of time are available in the Ethiopian government archives in addition 

to a growing body of scholarly literature on the conflict. There are at least two PhD theses dedicated to the conflict - Yasin, M.Y (2010); Muauz Gidey (2018) and a significant number of academic articles on the subject. The arrival of the Italian colonial power to the region in mid 1930s, the emergence of Somali nationalism and its irredentists Greater Somalia Project upon independence in 1960, the independence of Djibouti in 1977, the Djibouti civil war (Afar & Issa), the Eritrean independence in 1993, lucrative illicit trade interests, and major changes within Ethiopia at different times, have all influenced the Afar-Issa conflict changing its scope and dynamics overtime. 


The long history of the Afar-Issa relationship can be traced back to the 14th century coastal town of Zeila and its surroundings (not always a conflict). Zeila, one of the oldest cities on the East African coast, is in today’s Somaliland and was the capital city of the early Ifat Sultanate during the 9th century and continued to be that of its successor the Sultanate of Adal (Al-Shami, 1997).


The more recent conflict between the two communities that changed the dynamics of 

confrontation started with the involvement of the Italian colonial power. In 1935, the Italian colonial force launched an invasion against Ethiopia from its bases in the Italian Somaliland. 

The Italians in their effort to rally the Afar and Somali support against the Ethiopian resistance tried to exploit religious and cultural differences as well as low land and high land dichotomy. 

They consequently managed to secure support of a significant number of Somalis including the Issa clan. The Afar, on the other hand, not only rejected the Italian proposition but also fought against them siding with the Ethiopian resistance force (Sylvia Pankhurst 1959:329). The Italians not only retaliated by unleashing a series of military campaigns, mass disarmament and economic suction but also armed and actively supported the Issa against the Afar.

Consequently, the Issa with Italian support of military training and modern weapons, found it an easy raid to advance deep into the Afar homeland with little resistance from the Afar crushed by the Italian punitive measures. They subsequently controlled villages such as Asbuli and Ayroli marching to Mero. As Markakis (2002:447) has noted, the Italian interference, in short, changed the balance of power in favor of one party to the conflict producing thereby winners and losers. 

The Italian interference, which was a turning point, further changed the nature, scope and objectives of the conflict transforming it into a new phase.

Following the end of the Italian invasion, the imperial government as part of its effort to address the conflict introduced new administrative structures. In 1944, a new Wereda incorporating part Afar and Issa with Afdem as its capital was established. The Issas were restricted from crossing Bulga, Aydora, Erer, Fa’o while the Afar restricted from crossing from Ayroli, Asbuli, Biya’ad, Merihan and Andido’ (Yasin 2010: 157). 


This did not deter further expansion of the Issa and the imperial government in 1970 placed the two groups under two different Awrajas with clearly defined borders. The Afar were incorporated in Adal and Garaguracha Awraja with a capital in Asebe-Teferi while the Issa was included in Dire Dawa, Issa and Gurgura Awraja with a capital in Dire Dawa. Neither restructuring of administrative units nor demarcation of boundaries were successful in slowing down the Issa offensive let alone mitigate the conflict.

The two groups during the Ethio-Somalia war of 1977-78 once again found themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. The Afar stood on the Ethiopian side. The Issa echoed and acted upon the Somali’s open claim that the Awash River is the western border of lost territories.

The Derg, alarmed by the experience of the Somali war, initially tried to disarm the Issa with no success. Concerned with security of the main road linking Addis to Assab and Djibouti, the Derg later created and enforced a 20kms (from the main road) buffer zone separating the two groups.

After the arrival of TPLF dominated government in 1991, the Derg‘s buffer-zone was quickly breached allowing the Issa to set up settlements along the main road at the heart of Afar homeland namely in Adaytu, Undaffo, and Gedamaytu. As Yasin (2010:178-79) noted, the Issa breaching the buffer zone with a surprising speed took one giant leap which enabled them to step their foot on the main asphalt road. Reports on the Afar and Issa conflict since include no words such as Erer, Mero, Mullu, Afdem etc and rather focused on the hamlets along the road like Adaytu, Gedmaytu, and Unduffo.


According to Muauz (2010), “in effect, in the first five years after the downfall of the Dergue, the Issa controlled more territories than they had in thirty years.” An overview of the Issa historical expansion through a continuous eviction of the Afar from their homeland overtime (1936-2006) is better illustrated by Simone Rettberg ( May 2014 ) in the below mapThe newly born settlements flourished quickly, becoming important hubs of an illicit trade network protected by powerful regional and local backers, a force that have since become an important factor in the conflict. They rapidly become flashpoints of conflict between the new Issa inhabitants and the Afar from surrounding areas. The Issa in a few years’ time consolidated their position by populating the new settlements ensuring Afar are not welcome. The Afar, finding themselves cut off in three places within their territory, were forced to avoid travelling through these settlements. The EPRDF in 2014 imposed an agreement on the Somali and Afar Regional State leadership 

where the Afar ownership of the land was recognized and the three settlements occupied by Issa granted special Kebele status under the Afar Regional State, an offer rejected out of hand by both sides. 

The Issa would not settle for anything less than annexing the settlements to Sitti zone through referendum while the Afar opposed the idea they viewed as not only as a recognition of Afar territories taken by force which amounted to rewarding the aggressor but also as a dangerous precedence which encourages the Issa to invade more Afar land. The Afar, moreover, pushed for a clear demarcation of border between the two communities and its enforcement, a demand Afar repeatedly tabled since the imperial period and opposed repeatedly by the Issa side. 

Though important factors, the decades-long conflict is no more a conflict over scarce natural resources such as paster and water nor a border conflict as lately presented by some observers. Such clarification of the decades-long and dynamic conflict is simplification and misleading. The nature, scope, actors, and objectives of the conflict has changed over time transforming into a complex and multi-dimensional conflict. Whether there is adequate realization and understanding of such changes and dynamics remains a major question.


Djibouti’s role in the Afar-Issa conflict is an issue that comes up frequently. President Ismail Omar Guelleh who successfully exploited multiple crisis in the region to his advantage (collapse of Somali as state, Ethio-Eritrean war, terrorist threats including piracy in the area) deployed his new influence and power not only to consolidate his power base in Djibouti but also to aggressively enhance the Issa position in the region practically in the land locked and dependent Ethiopia. Djibouti’s ambition in Ethiopia includes a quest for the Issa Regional State through consolidation of the current Sitti zone in Somali Region and through expansion into Afar territory in Ethiopia. With a fresh memory of the early 1990s civil war between the Afar and Issa(both parts at the time actively mobilized their communities across the borders), Djibouti further aims at weakening the Afar base in Ethiopia by supporting the Issa side to secure continuation of domination of political power in Djibouti. In other words, the Afar-Issa conflict in Ethiopia remains interwoven with Djibouti’s internal politics. 

Consequently, Djibouti’s backing and interference in the Issa- Afar conflict in Ethiopia remained not a secret. Confiscated Djibouti regular military IDs on battlefields and captured military personnel including high ranking officers have become all too common. Retaliatory attacks on Afar civilians in Djibouti following setbacks across the border in Ethiopia has become yet another regular scene.


Ismail Guelleh, last year, surprised regional observers when he announced his intention of exploiting the waters of the Awash River, which flows for its entire length within Ethiopia, most of it through the Afar Region. Equally surprising was the Ethiopian government’s silence on the incident that prompted public outcry. Guelleh further managed to provoke again when he appeared on national TV with a background map highlighting details of Issa ambition/claim on the Afar territories in Ethiopia.

The Afar side accuses Djibouti of being the main sponsor of Issa aggression and expansion by facilitating material including weapons, financial and even deploying Djibouti’s military personnel. The Issa side, on the other hand, accuses the Ethiopian government of siding with Afar.

There were times when the Afar-Issa conflict was viewed as confrontation between two nomadic communities on the periphery that did not affect national security or interest. It has become clear during recent years that this is no more the case though such a view still prevails in some quarters.

Series of high-profile peace conferences have produced no tangible results and the eight and half decades old violent conflict continues to claim thousands of lives with no end in sight so far. Addressing the Afar-Issa conflict effectively requires a broader perspective, understanding its dynamics and a serious commitment to resolve it.